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Abstract: In response to the seventeen commentaries to date on my target article on 
reducing animal suffering, I propose that the term “welfarism” (when used pejoratively by 
animal advocates) should be qualified as “anthropocentric welfarism” so as to leave 
“welfarism” simpliciter to be used in its generic sense of efforts to improve conditions for 
those who need it. Welfarism in this benign sense — even in its specific utilitarian form 
(maximizing the sum total of net welfare) with long-term future effects and effects on others 
(including animals) appropriately taken into account — should be unobjectionable (even if 
not considered sufficient by all advocates). Rights, both animal and human, should be 
similarly grounded in the promotion of welfare. My strategic proposal to concentrate on 
reducing the suffering of farm animals now has been criticized as putting human interests 
above those of animals and as ignoring the suffering of animals in the wild. These criticisms 
misunderstand my position and fail to distinguish between the short and long run or 
between strategy and ideal morality. My position is consistent with perfect impartiality 
between animals and humans at the level of ideal morality. I also respond to the extreme 
asymmetrical focus on reducing suffering, ignoring the moral importance of pleasure (the 
argument against trading off “my orgasms against others’ agony”). Even mild measures for 
reducing animal suffering such as enlarging cage size for factory chickens and prohibiting 
the cutting of live eels have to be based on some interpersonal and interspecies comparisons 
of welfare. We must not use the philosophical uncertainty about the comparability or the 
very existence of animal sentience to diminish our efforts to protect animal welfare. 
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I am glad that my target article (Ng 2016) has so far attracted 17 commentaries from animal 
advocates (Lori Marino), animal charity evaluators (Allison Smith & Jacy Reese), animal 
and bioethicists (Catia Faria, Oscar Horta, Joel Marks, Jessica Pierce), biologists (Marc 
Bekoff, Liv Baker), environmentalists (Simon Leadbeater), philosophers (Stijn Bruers, 
Stephen R. Clark, Kyle Johannsen, Eze Paez, Bernard Rollin, Beril Sözmen), an attorney 
(Daniel Dorado), a cognitive scientist (Stevan Harnad), and a political scientist (Peter J. 
Li). I am grateful to them for their involvement. Rather than responding to separate 
commentaries in turn, I will largely focus on separate issues in turn. 





1. Welfarism vs. Anthropocentric Welfarism 
 
A repeated theme in the commentary is that I am a welfarist putting human interest above 
that of animals. For example: “Ng assumes, quite in line with the broader ideology of animal 
welfare, that human industry is more important than the well-being of animals. This has 
been called “welfarism” (Bekoff & Pierce 2016). This is a big misunderstanding of my 
position. Before explaining why, I have to make an important terminological distinction. 
 
The original term “welfarism” as traditionally used by philosophers and economists does 
not have the connotation of anthropocentricism. Welfarism just means that what is of 
ultimate importance/value is the welfare of sentient organisms (human or animal). 
Moreover, most economic and philosophical problems have been discussed independently 
of animal welfare. This independent discussion does not entail that animal welfare is not 
important, as the level of animal welfare may be held unchanged conceptually to focus on 
non-animal issues. The point here is that the traditional term “welfarism” just means that it 
is welfare that is of ultimate value. In its pure form (to which I subscribe), ultimately 
speaking, it is welfare only that is of intrinsic value. In this sense of welfarism, I am a 100% 
welfarist. I am in fact also a utilitarian, believing that, for human society (ignoring issues of 
animal welfare, see below), the morally acceptable ultimate objective is to maximize the 
unweighted (or equally weighted) sum of individual welfares. (Thus, Johannsen’s 
observation that I am a “self-proclaimed utilitarian” is correct.) Welfarism makes perfect 
sense. If not, why are we concerned only with human rights and animal rights, and not with 
stone rights and table rights? What is not susceptible to welfare is not of (direct and 
intrinsic) moral importance. (For a fuller defence of welfarism and utilitarianism, see Ng 
1975, 1990, 2013.) 
 
To see the importance of welfarism, consider a non-welfarist ethicist who believes the 
following: We should be moral only towards those who have morals; animals (perhaps 
excluding some higher primates?) have no morals. So we do not have to care about animal 
welfare. We may inflict suffering on them without being immoral. If he believes in this as his 
ultimate categorical imperative, I do not think I can argue against him or persuade him of 
the importance of caring for animals before I can persuade him to give up his arbitrary 
imperative and convince him of the acceptability of welfarism. 
 
In animal rights circles, at least among the stronger advocates, “welfarism” is used in quite a 
different sense. For example, Doris Lin, an animal rights attorney and Director of Legal 
Affairs for the Animal Protection League of New Jersey, defines welfarism as follows: 
  
Welfarism is the belief that humans have the right to use animals as we see fit as long 
as they are treated humanely. There may be some uses where the benefit to humans is 
recognized as trivial compared to the amount of animal suffering, such as dogfighting 
or fur, where the use is believed to be unjustified. The term "welfarist," as an adjective, 
is used pejoratively by animal rights advocates to refer to a situation where animals 
will continue to be used with very minimal improvements in the care, confinement or 
slaughter of the animals (Lin 2016). 





This pejorative sense of welfarism is consistent with Bekoff & Pierce’s usage. I am not a 
welfarist in this sense. In my target article I do not assume that human industry is more 
important than animal welfare. For utilitarian calculations, importance does not depend on 
species but on the relative size of the welfare gains and losses involved. 
 
Since the original concept of welfarism does not imply anthropocentrism, the pejorative 
sense of “welfarism” as it is used by some animal rights advocates is misleading and 
confusing. I would accordingly suggest calling this kind of welfarism “anthropocentric 
welfarism,” reserving the generic term “welfarism” for the traditional non-derogatory sense 
of the term. This may not only reduce misunderstanding but could well increase the 
potential influence of animal rights advocates. I think a welfarist like myself should be 
regarded by the animal rights advocates as a potential convert rather than as an enemy, if 
not already a strong ally or even one of them. Using “welfarism” pejoratively tends to 
alienate welfarists. “Welfare” is definitely something good; “welfarism” must not be used 
pejoratively.  
 
Some welfarists may be anthropocentric, but not all welfarists need be. Welfarism itself is 
quite consistent with perfect impartiality between animal and human welfare. I cannot 
myself claim such perfect or even “near” perfect impartiality even towards my fellow 
humans. However, in terms of ideal morality in the formal sense, I have adhered to 
impartiality towards all people (for the case of animals, see below) and even potential 
future people not yet born (Ng 1989, 2005). Most economists (indeed most social scientists 
and policy debaters) do their analysis without considering a possible change in the set of 
people concerned. For the minority who do, most regard unborn people as not having any 
rights. I had a heated debate with a Nobel laureate in economics, John Harsanyi, on this (Ng 
1983). Though I have not formally written on animal-human impartiality, I accept this 
impartiality at the level of ideal morality. Ideal morality is not the same as practical reality, 
however. It would be ideal if we could treat animals impartially, but as a species, as nations 
and as individuals, we have our own interests, and in reality there are conflicts of interest in 
which some sentient suffering is inescapable.  
 
I do not pretend to be a morally perfect person in practice, but the moral philosophy I 
believe in (simply put: net welfare maximization for all sentients) is arguably perfect, at 
least as far as I can see. It should of course be subject to criticism and, if needed and 
possible, to improvements (though I have yet to see convincing argument of a need for 
improvement). Nevertheless, going from ideal morality at the philosophical level to the 
practical level, individuals (myself included) and societies may be partial towards their own 
welfare. None of the points made in my target article, however, is based on this possible 










2. Ideals vs. Practical Strategies; Short vs. Long Runs 
 
The main reason my target article is consistent with perfect impartiality is that it outlines 
practical strategies to achieve our objective of reducing animal suffering or improving 
animal net welfare in the short run; it does not expound ideals. The article suggests that, to 
have (relatively) fast successes in achieving our objectives, the strategies proposed are 
likely to be productive, partly because they do not impose high costs on humans and partly 
because this makes them more likely to be acceptable to the majority. I am not arguing that 
we should not do more than what I have proposed, especially in the longer run. Thus, many 
of the critical points made by my commentators are not inconsistent with my own position; 
it is just that there is often some misunderstanding of what my position is. For example, 
Bekoff & Pierce write: “While Professor Ng clearly sees the need to address animal 
suffering, he aims far too low and stops far short of the goal, and in the end favors 
continuing to use the paradigm of animal welfare along with its various loopholes that favor 
human interests over those of other animals. Surely we can and must do more.” But doing 
more is consistent with my position; my target article does not “favor human interests over 
those of other animals.”  
 
While many proposals made by the commentators are consistent with my target article, I 
must admit the possibility that I am being too pessimistic here in thinking that many 
proposals are unlikely to be practicable, at least in the fairly long “short run.” I thought I 
was born optimistic; indeed, I’ve often been regarded by others as being too optimistic, both 
academically and personally. I lose money in the share market by being too optimistic and 
have not learned from this knowledge to rectify my over-optimistic inclination. (Thus, I lost 
money again in the last round of share-market decline; in fact, I lost so much that I have 
even had to postpone my payments to an animal ethics group in sponsoring a matching 
donation!) However, I find many proposals unlikely to be practically feasible, at least not for 
a very long time. For example: 
 
1. ‘To eradicate suffering in the poultry industry requires the elimination of the 
industry itself” (Leadbeater 2016). This may be true but it is unlikely to be 
practicable. Nor is “the eventual abolition of animal agriculture” (Smith & Reese 
2016) likely to be practicable any time soon. Before the poultry industry or even the 
whole of animal agriculture can be eliminated, we still need to work to eliminate the 
appallingly small cages, etc. While we work to abolish all cruelty, let us also work to 
reduce it.  
2. “Although livestock and slave welfare improvements might be low-cost, quick-win 
measures, they are far from sufficient ethically” (Bruers 2016). Agreed; but even the 
quick-win battles are far from having been won yet. 
3. “Ng underestimates the potential benefits of advocacy for wild animals in terms of 
net reduction in suffering perhaps because he is overestimating people’s resistance 
to caring about wild animals and to intervening in nature on their behalf” (Paez 
2016). I wish I were “overestimating people’s resistance,” but could Paez be 
underestimating it? 




4. “Analyses by meta-charities suggest that vegan outreach is a more effective strategy 
to help farmed animals. This is the strategy of convincing individuals that they must 
cease to consume animal products, for the sake of the animals themselves” (Paez 
2016). It would be good and indeed admirable if this could be successful on a large 
scale and if the reduction in human welfare, if any, were more than offset by the gain 
in animal welfare. But I really cannot pin too much hope on this, despite my 
optimistic tendencies.  
 
3. Animal Welfare vs. Animal Rights 
 
The fact that I am a welfarist (in its original sense, without entailing anthropocentricism) 
does not mean that I do not believe in rights. However, being a welfarist, I believe that 
rights, whether human or animal, should, at least ultimately speaking, be for the sake of 
enhancing welfare. The insistence on certain human or animal rights may be a good 
strategy for reducing suffering and hence good for the promotion of welfare in the long run. 
Insisting on the fundamental importance of human and animal rights at the practical or 
political level may also be good — read “long-run welfare maximizing” — to avoid 
compromising these rights for short-term welfare or other interests to the detriment of 
welfare in the long run. However, at the fundamental level of moral philosophy, rights for 
rights’ sake do not make sense to me. Whether in the form of human rights, animal rights, 
the Kantian categorical imperative, moral principles or what not, these should ultimately be 
based on welfare considerations. 
 
For example, for hundreds of years, people in ancient China believed in the intrinsic moral 
principle of “one woman should not serve two men/husbands” (一女不事二夫) such that a 
woman should not remarry even long after the death of her husband. Allowing such 
intrinsic moral principles or categorical imperatives irrespective of their contribution to 
welfare resulted in huge suffering. After prolonged criticism, including by many novelists, 
this damaging imperative was given up as wrong. Did this sort of thing only happen to 
ancient people? Couldn’t it happen today? Even right now, as reported early in April 2016, 
we have many thousands of so-called honour killings (typically by brothers or cousins 
killing their sisters/cousins for falling in love with men) each year in a single country like 
Pakistan. Does this only happen in underdeveloped countries? Euthanasia is still illegal 
almost worldwide (with the exception of the Netherlands), even for doctors helping 
suffering patients who have chosen to end their miserable and hopeless lives. 
Intrinsic/categorical principles not justified by welfare considerations are causing 
enormous suffering right now worldwide even just within our own species. 
 
I am willing to accept the formulation of rights, but only for the promotion of long-term 
welfare, human or animal. Doing a cost-benefit analysis each time a decision has to be made 
is impractical and too costly, so adopting certain rights-based rules and laws may be 
welfare enhancing. This may be true for our personal routines, human relationships, 
national affairs, and human-animal relationships. However, our decisions about whether 
these rules or laws should be introduced, sustained or rejected should ultimately be based 
on long-term welfare considerations. Accepting intrinsic principles or categorical 
imperatives irrespective of their contribution to welfare may lead — and has led — to 




enormous suffering, as pointed out in the examples in the preceding paragraph. They 
should definitely be rejected. 
 
Since we almost certainly have more than just one single rule/principle/law to guide us, 
what should we do when one rule is in conflict with another? Which rule should we give up? 
As once happened when a radio announcer made a racist remark, should he be allowed to 
do so based on the rule protecting free speech or should he be stopped or penalized for 
violating the rule forbidding racism? When rules conflict, the reasonable ultimate principle 
to judge which rule to follow should again be long-term welfare, taking likely side effects 
into account as much as possible. But whose welfare? For a social problem not concerning 
animals, it should be the welfare of all individuals in the society, counting the welfare of 
each individual impartially (which is satisfied by, but not only by, utilitarianism). For 
problems involving animal welfare, too, overall welfare should be taken into account. My 
target article does not abandon the option of impartiality here: Animal and human welfare 
should be treated similarly, at least at the level of ideal morality. However, at least in the 
near term, we are unlikely to be able to achieve or even approach this ideal. If we were able 
to persuade human society to treat animal welfare as having even just 1% the importance of 
human welfare, we should long have banned countless gratuitously cruel practices such as 
cutting living eels in half, imposing heavy penalties on violators without hesitation. 
 
4. Stevan Harnad’s Critique of Utilitarianism/Welfarism 
 
I am a self-professed utilitarian both in human public policy (abstracting from animal 
welfare) and in animal welfare issues, as mentioned above. Ideally, we want to have high 
net welfare, human or animal. Of course, there could be interpersonal and interspecies 
conflicts. However, as ultimately only happiness is of intrinsic positive value and pain is of 
intrinsic negative value, we should want high net welfare. I may want higher net welfare for 
myself, but society should be impartial and take the net welfare of everyone as equally 
important. If we are not homocentric, we should also consider animal welfare. This is 
roughly what I regard as utilitarianism, as generalized to include animal welfare. (In fact, 
the great utilitarian Bentham was also a champion of animal rights. Subsequent discussion 
of utilitarianism, however, focused largely on human individuals.) If not utilitarianism, we 
should at least want welfarism: Strictly speaking, utilitarianism requires the less widely 
acceptable criterion of maximizing the unweighted or equally weighted sum of individual 
welfares. Most of my arguments depend only on welfarism, not utilitarianism. However, 
Harnad’s commentary casts serious doubt both on the moral basis and practicability of 
utilitarianism and welfarism. Two or three separate though somewhat related points are 
involved. 
 
First, at some points (see qualifications below), Harnad seems to regard pain and pleasure 
as incommensurable, suggesting that they cannot be traded off against each other, contrary 
to both utilitarianism and common sense. Even a mouse has the common sense of trading 
off pain and pleasure, as when it decides to cross a strip of painful electric shock to obtain 
the pleasure of electric stimulation of the pleasure center in its brain (Jacques 1979). We 
make similar trade-offs all the time, though a good decision maker should take into account 
not only immediate effects but also side- and long-term effects; an ethical decision maker 




should take account also the effects on others, including animals. Thus, I fail to see the 
incommensurability of pain and pleasure at least in principle, though the actual comparison 
involves difficulties. 
 
However, Harnad does not mean incommensurability for oneself, only interpersonally: “To 
put it another way, orgasms cannot be traded off against agony. I can do it for myself, 
deciding how many lashes I would personally endure in exchange for how many orgasms. 
But no one else can judge that for me; I doubt that any two individuals would agree on their 
personal trade-offs. And there’s certainly no way to trade off my orgasms against others’ 
agony in some sort of integrated pain/pleasure formula purporting to maximize net welfare 
for a population.” 
 
The question of “my orgasms against others’ agony” at least involves: (1) The question of 
self-interest vs. the welfare of the group, briefly touched on above (and below); (2) the 
feasibility of interpersonal comparison of welfare. I have argued for the interpersonal 
comparability of welfare, at least in principle, though acknowledging some practical 
difficulties which will be gradually overcome as our knowledge advances (Ng 1997, 2015). 
Discussion of issues of animal welfare has to be based on some degree of interspecies 
comparison of welfare as well. If we deny any such comparison, one could make the 
anthropocentric argument: “How could you inflict on me the pain of eating less meat in 
order to increase the comfort of factory chickens?”  
 
Most changes (including but not confined to those related to animal welfare) are not 
Paretian (Arnold 2015; Cowen 2005). A Paretian change makes all sentient individuals 
(including animals) better off (i.e., having higher levels of net welfare) or at least no worse 
off. For most changes, some individuals are made worse off. Such changes may still be 
justified morally if more individuals are made better off, and to a greater degree, taking all 
effects into account. But this requires the interpersonal/interspecies comparison of welfare 
gains and losses (or orgasms and agonies). If we refuse to make these comparisons, we are 
likely to be stuck with the status quo. Even the mildest proposals made in my target article 
— such as increasing cage size for factory chickens and prohibiting the cutting of live eels — 
are likely to incur some adjustment costs and will make some individuals worse off, at least 
in the short run. Though actual inter-individual comparisons may be difficult to make and 
subject to imperfect accuracy, we must not use the philosophical doubt about comparability 
to impede our protection of animal welfare, just as we should not use the minute possibility 
of the non-existence of animal sentience to hinder our concern for animal welfare. 
(Obviously, being the founder of Animal Sentience, Harnad is in agreement with me on the 
latter; perhaps he could also be persuaded by my position on the former?) The precise 
maximization of the aggregate sum of net welfare may be impossible in practice, but it is 
still desirable to have more net welfare rather than less, even if imprecisely. 
 
I also argue elsewhere that beliefs about the impossibility of comparing welfare 
interpersonally and about the unacceptability of utilitarianism are based on a non-
materialist solution to the theory of mind, i.e., on the existence of souls. The compellingness 
of the theory of evolution and of some discoveries in brain science (including the split-brain 
experiments) render (philosophical) materialism very persuasive. Accepting materialism 




implies that the self is not significant. (There is no substantive reason to care much more 
about the welfare of one's own future self than the welfare of others, but few individuals, 
myself included, can escape the fitness-enhancing and naturally selected inclination to care 
much more about oneself.) Materialism also implies that it is possible to compare welfare 
across individuals, and is makes utilitarianism compelling. Moreover, even the existence of 
souls would not necessarily rule out comparability or utilitarianism (Ng 1992). 
 
There is also the moral issue. Harnad regards pain or suffering as the sole welfare and 
moral concern; pleasure is morally irrelevant. (This may be called extreme negative 
utilitarianism/welfarism.) As he puts it, “What happens in a world of pleasure zombies is as 
morally irrelevant as what happens in a world of insentient zombies or a world of rocks.” I 
would certainly strongly prefer to be a pleasure zombie rather than either an insentient 
zombie or a rock. If I were a pleasure zombie, I would also certainly want to have more 
rather than less pleasure (holding the net welfare levels of all other sentients unchanged). It 
is an important concern to me, and I think it should also be of moral concern to a zombie 
society that includes me.  
 
In Harnad’s view, “the only welfare calculations that matter are the ones that minimize pain, 
factoring in pleasure only to the extent that being deprived of pleasure may sometimes be 
painful.” Thus, if we keep side effects on others and in the future to zero for simplicity of 
comparison, and include all effects (including the pain from deprivation of pleasure) in the 
comparison below, Harnad would prefer (or at least would think that morally one should 
prefer) a life of A: 100 units of pain plus one unit of pleasure, to B: 101 units of pain plus ten 
trillion units of pleasure, because A has less pain. I and most people have no hesitation in 
choosing B (as the stimulation-seeking mouse also would) either for ourselves or for some 
other individual or society (with everyone having the same pain-pleasure profile in either A 
or B above). (Readers having doubts on the possibility of speaking of units of pain and 
pleasure may consult the literature on just-perceptible differences (Weber 1834; Dennis 
1948); see, e.g. Edgeworth 1881 and Ng 1975.) 
 
Another point for consideration: If only the minimization of pain were important and the 
maintenance and promotion of pleasure were not, would the instantaneous destruction of 
the whole world not be the best alternative? All pains would be minimized to zero. Though 
all pleasures would also vanish; they are not important! 
 
Yet another related point: If we cannot measure, compare, and even guestimate welfare 
inter-individually (including human and animal individuals), how are we going to make the 
following choice? Suppose (perhaps because of resource limitations) we can only choose 
between: X = increase the cage size for all farmed chickens by a certain amount versus Y = 
keep the cage size unchanged, but convert a fraction (e.g., half) of all factory-farmed 
chickens into free-range chickens? (For simplicity, assume no effects on others and no 
indirect effects; only the welfare of the chickens is affected.) Even if we agree with Harnad 
that the objective should be to minimize pain, which alternative has less pain? Before 
choosing between X and Y, I would like to know or at least guestimate the amount of pain 
reduction both from (1) having the larger cage size and from (2) converting from the larger 
cage size to free range for the other half of the chickens. If we have to compare the amount 




of pain reduction for different chickens, we may also have to compare orgasms and agonies 
for different individuals for many other choices. 
 
Harnad and I appear to be in agreement on the point that it is sentience (i.e., the felt states 
of feeling organisms) that is of moral importance, not the unfelt states of insentient 
organisms, hypothetical zombies or inanimate rocks. However, while I regard both pain and 
pleasure as equally important and valuable, one having negative and the other positive 
value, Harnad has an extreme asymmetrical view. Harnad’s moral imperative of only 
minimizing pain, without including pleasure in the welfare or moral consideration is the 
most extreme one I have encountered. However, the less extreme, but still stronger 
emphasis on the importance of pain reduction in contrast to pleasure enhancement is 
widespread in moral philosophy, both for the academic world and the general public. This 
asymmetrical treatment of pain and pleasure (assigning higher importance of pain 
avoidance) appears to be inconsistent with utilitarianism. I accept this asymmetrical 
treatment at the level of practical living, business, laws, etc. on the grounds of the likelihood 
that the indirect effects of pain reduction on future welfare would be larger than those of 
pleasure enhancement. For example, either bodily pain or mental suffering is likely to cause 
negative effects on us, reducing our future welfare. In addition, harming others is likely to 
create interpersonal conflicts, social disharmony, etc. which are very detrimental to long-
term welfare. On account of these practical considerations, it may be desirable to have 
certain legally protected rights (to avoid pain infliction) that should be largely (but not 
totally) immune from short-term considerations. However, why some rights and not others? 
Such considerations ultimately have to be justified on the basis of long-term welfare, as 
argued in the previous section. Nevertheless, at the fundamental level of moral philosophy, 
after taking all effects in the future and on all sentients into account, a world of higher net 
welfare is a better world. So, there is no violation of utilitarianism. 
 
Utilitarianism is fine; it just has to be sophisticated. Not focusing only on oneself and on the 
present, it must also take into account the future, other people, and other sentients. 
However, because of the importance of the asymmetrical emphasis on pain avoidance at the 
practical level, many people, including accomplished moral philosophers have been (in my 
view) misled into believing in the asymmetrical treatment for its own sake, regarding 
utilitarianism as an unacceptable moral position. 
 
5. Some Interesting Points and Some Misunderstandings/Clarifications 
 
A point that is of both conceptual interest and practical importance is raised by Bruers: 
“The strategy of transforming the livestock sector with animal welfare improvements often 
results in a trade-off with environmental goals.…Less intensive production (e.g., slower 
growth of animals) is better in terms of animal welfare but also results in decreased 
resource efficiency and hence a bigger ecological footprint.” As an economist, I know my 
preferred way to tackle this problem.  
 
If we impose sufficient taxes on important sources of external costs (costs imposed on 
others including the whole world, without compensation) including pollution and emission 
of greenhouse gases or other contributors to the ecological footprint, we may proceed with 




animal welfare regulation on its own merits, without worrying about its indirect impact on 
the ecology. Under this proposal, all users of resources/processes have to pay for both the 
direct and indirect costs. The pursuit of their own self-interest would then result in socially 
efficient usage. Taxes on external costs are not my proposal but that of Arthur Pigou 
(1912/1932) a century ago (See Ng 2004a, Ch. 7 for a discussion). The Pigovian taxes are in 
accordance with the amount of damage imposed on others. Many people, economists 
included, think that these are impossible to estimate, especially for issues like global 
warming, which concern the whole world for centuries into the future. However, it is 
desirable to tax external costs (at least) at the marginal costs of abating the environmental 
disruption; and these costs are easier to estimate than the marginal damage of disruption. 
Moreover, these taxes will normally yield total revenue in excess of the optimal amount of 
abatement spending, as shown in Ng (2004b). 
 
A number of commentators (including Bekoff & Pierce, Baker, and Leadbeater) mention 
the point about the less than 100% certainty about animal suffering. I mentioned this 
mainly because I was trying to argue for the feasibility of studying animal welfare despite 
the paradox (related to this lack of certainty) emphasized by Dawkins (2014). Thus, rather 
than intending to justify ignoring animal suffering for lack of 100% certainty, I just pointed 
out that we also lack 100% certainty about the welfare of our spouses! Let me try to put this 
another way. Suppose we are 99.9999% certain of the welfare susceptibility of our fellow 
humans and, say, even 1,000 times (probably an over-estimate) less certain of that 
susceptibility in chickens. That means that we are still 99.9% certain. Surely, we should not 
relinquish our responsibility for chickens on that 0.1% probability that they may not suffer. 
Though 99.9999% and 99.9% involve a difference in the degree of certainty of 1,000 times, 
the probability of uncertainty involved is still less than 0.1% which is surely far too small to 
justify ignoring animal welfare. 
 
Before we are willing to fly, we need a certainty of safety of 99.99% or more (I would 
require more than 99.9999% safety unless the flight is unusually important). Even if 
chickens are 1,000 times less important than ourselves, we should need at least 90% 
certainty of non-feeling before we should largely ignore their possibility of suffering. Even a 
10% or 5% likelihood of large suffering should not be completely ignored, not to mention 
90% or 99.9%. For practical purposes, instead of philosophical musing, we should take the 
animal welfare needs of all mammals and most if not all vertebrates as if it were certain, i.e., 
we should ignore the difference (of less than 0.1%) between 99.9% and 99.9999% for 
simplicity. 
 
Harnad also mentions probability; I have no problem in giving “the other mind the benefit 
of the doubt”; I thought my target article and my current response above went much further 
than that. (Stevan Harnad’s commentary is partly, if not mainly, commenting on my 
response, not just my target article.) However, my position here could be misinterpreted to 
mean the opposite of what I intend, if not read carefully. 
 
A related clarification: I agree completely that “the condition on which the applicability of 
moral concern depends “is not a capacity to think, but a capacity to feel (i.e., sentience)” 




(Johannsen). I have never held “the view that such cognitive abilities are necessary for full 
moral standing.”  
 
I do not understand the usage of some commentators of “welfare” in contrast to “well-being.” 
For example, Bekoff & Pierce call for “Replacing the science of animal welfare with the 
science of animal well-being”; Baker calls for “moving toward a ‘science of animal well-
being’….As in human research on well-being, a science devoted to the well-being of animals 
should be asking ‘what makes life worth living?’.”  
 
I regard my welfare as identical to my well-being which is my net happiness (enjoyment 
minus suffering, both interpreted in the wide sense inclusive of bodily and spiritual 
feelings). We tend to use happiness less informally and to refer to current feelings and use 
welfare or well-being (or subjective well-being) more formally and to refer to longer-term 
feelings. If we ignore the degree of formality and hold the period constant, I see absolutely 
no difference in my (net) happiness, welfare or well-being. If we ignore the contributions 
towards the welfare of other individuals (human and animal), what makes life worth living 
is the welfare of that individual. Even for contributions towards others, they should be in 
terms of welfare. Ultimately speaking, only happiness or welfare is of intrinsic value (Ng 
1990, 2013, 2015). I thus fail to see the difference between the science of animal (or human 
for that matter) welfare and the science of animal well-being. I await enlightenment. 
 
I can see that some commentators may be using “well-being” in some more objective sense, 
such as being in good health and exhibiting normal behaviour. However, a person could be 
in good health but very unhappy for various reasons; the normal conditions for most 
animals could still mean large negative net welfare (Ng 1995). Being healthy now may be 
important for a long and happy life; but it is the total net welfare (plus any contribution 
towards the increase in net welfare of others, animal or human) that is of value. When we 
do not have good indicators for health, we may use cruder indicators such as size; when we 
do not have good indicators for welfare, we may use indirect indicators such as health. 
However, regarding the moral issues of animal rights and welfare, the ultimate concern 
should be with welfare, not with cruder indicators such as health or “well-being” (if defined 
to be different from welfare). If we could go to the ultimate level of welfare, as my target 
article, my 1995 paper and many other animal advocates argue, then using the cruder 
concepts of health or other indicators of objective well-being, though probably serving 
certain other purposes where useful, would be a retreat, not an advance, at least in the 
sense of the depth of analysis or the level of ultimate moral concern. 
 
Some quick points for clarifications: 
 
 “Ng’s phrase ‘virtually costless’ is troublesome because there are always costs to the 
animals” (Bekoff & Pierce). I use “costless” to refer to the costs on humans, not the 
costs to the animals. If we could substantially reduce animal suffering at little or even 
negative costs on humans, should that not be definitely done? But I never say that we 
should not do more. 
 “The life of every individual matters” (Bekoff & Pierce). I disagree. What matters is the 
property of sentience (i.e., feeling) of sentient living individuals, not just the property of 




being a living organism. Presumably not all living things feel. Feeling and mattering are 
inextricably related. Nothing matters to or about an unfeeling rock (as Harnad also 
apparently agrees). Just the fact of living does not matter intrinsically in the case of 
unfeeling plants or animals (though it may matter if it engenders or affects the welfare 
of feeling individuals). That is why it is important to use welfare biology to help 
ascertain which species are sentient, hence capable of welfare (Ng 1995). Neither 
“intelligence” (i.e., performance capacity) nor life alone is of intrinsic moral significance; 
only the capacity for suffering or enjoying (i.e., feeling) matters morally. This is the 
importance that underlies the name of this journal: Animal Sentience. 
 “Ng seems unconcerned about mass extinctions…” (Lori Marino). This is clearly a gross 
misinterpretation of my position. There are some who believe that “Habitat destruction, 
not preservation, generally reduces wild-animal suffering” (Tomasik 2016). But though I 
am concerned with likely negative animal welfare, I am hoping for future salvation after 
significant scientific, economic, and ethical advances (Ng 1995). Thus, in contrast to 
Tomasik, I am not in favour of habitat destruction and/or mass extinctions — not to 
mention the likely threat that habitat destruction and mass extinctions due to our man-
made environmental disruption poses to global survival itself (Ng 2016), which is 
clearly very bad even just for human welfare. 
 Stephen Clark mentions “the freedom to express normal behaviour,” one of the “Five 
Freedoms” identified by the United Kingdom’s Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC 
2009). I wish to add here that “the freedom to express normal behaviour” may not be 
enough if Tomasik (2016) and I are right that most animals in the wild with their normal 
freedom to express normal behaviour may still have more suffering than enjoyment. We 
would have the moral obligation to reduce their suffering if we could do that safely, 
especially if it could be done at only moderate cost to humans. A person has the moral 
responsibility to help a fellow human in great danger or suffering if it could be done 
without too much danger and cost. A similar (perhaps slightly higher degree of) morality 
requires the extension of this help to animals. However, I think this should largely be left 
to the future, after there have been significant scientific and economic advances in the 
means of ensuring safety, for both animals and humans. 
 I am in almost full agreement with Catia Faria. However, I have not changed my views 
since 1995 as she seems to argue or imply. My 1995 paper tries to provide some basics 
for welfare biology, with a conclusion on the likely negative welfare in the animal world. 
My 2016 target article discusses some short-term tactics for achieving successes in 
reducing animal suffering. Whereas they tackle largely separate (though related) issues, 
both articles are fully consistent with one another; I have not been converted to “the 
idyllic view of nature.” In particular, the 2016 target article focuses on farmed animals 
but, as in 1995, does not exclude doing research now “on how to make it more feasible 
to carry out future long-term sustained interventions to benefit wild animals” and to 
help make people aware of huge animal suffering both in the food industry and in the 
wild. I still think it prudent, however, to leave actual large-scale interventions in the wild 
largely to the future. 
 Similarly, my agreement with Oscar Horta’s commentary would become complete if he 
just added the qualification (which I always used in my target article) “largely” to his 
clause describing my position: “leaving for the future the protection of animals in the 
wild.” (This qualification also makes it unnecessary to amend my “strategical 




viewpoint.”) I am very much in favour of raising awareness of animal suffering and 
helping animals even in the wild now; it is just that the large-scale attempts to raise 
animal welfare towards a positive level have to wait for great improvements in our 
capabilities, including our moral awareness and practices. Thus, the efforts of animal 
advocates and animal scientists are very important. Cooperation and persuasion are 
usually more fruitful than fighting one another. 
 Somewhat similarly, temporary priority in dealing with farmed animals does not 
preclude the “variety and pluralism” favoured by Beril Sözmen. Almost everyone would 
favour doing animal research without inflicting pain on animals wherever possible. But 
it may not be possible at all times. We view someone sacrificing herself voluntarily to 
defend her country from unjust invasion as heroic. The suffering incurred or the lives 
given up serve a greater cause. If some pain in some animals now could lead to a much 
greater reduction in suffering in the future, perhaps they may similarly be regarded as 
worthwhile? The difference is of course absence of consent. However, the question of 
consent and rights for animals vs. humans raises complex issues that are beyond the 
scope of this response. In simple terms, I still adhere to welfarism and utilitarianism, but 
the related issues are complex, including indirect effects and differences in the 
capabilities for consent, responsibility, and rights.   
 In his short commentary, Daniel Dorado makes an important point. I assume that 
ecosystem conservation is desirable. Yet I do not believe in the value of ecosystems per 
se or even of life itself: only sentience matters intrinsically and ultimately. Thus, 
conservation is of value only if enjoyment prevails over suffering. This, however, sounds 
like the opposite of an important conclusion in my 1995 paper concerning the likely 
predominance of suffering in the animal world, as Dorado sharply and correctly 
observes. I have not changed my mind since 1995; everything there stands. The 
apparent inconsistency is explained as follows: While the animal world exclusive of 
humans is probably dominated by suffering (which, incidentally, should increase our 
responsibility to help them), the lucky homo sapiens largely have positive net welfare, as 
indicated (but not conclusively proven, due to some inadequacies in happiness 
measurement; see Ng 1996) by happiness studies (Diener et al. 2010, Ng 2013). As 
animals outweigh humans in number, their net suffering may outweigh our net welfare. 
However, before we go along with Tomasik (2016) in promoting habitat destruction (as 
discussed above), surely we should give the benefit of the doubt to the possibility of 
reversing the net welfare imbalance. More important, my own pro-conservation stance 
is based on optimism about future economic, scientific, and moral advances (perhaps 
quite far away, but destined to last far longer). These could improve conditions so as to 
confer positive net welfare on most animals (starting now with our farmed animals). 
This way conservation would be consistent with the moral stance that only sentience 
matters.  
Last, I wish to thank the commentators for their support and suggestions, including 
particularly: 
 “Family squabbles aside, I would like to express my thanks to Prof. Ng for opening a new 
doorway into the study and actualization of animal welfare” (Bernard Rollin). 




 “Making science and industry humane will take time, but Ng's welfare biology is a step in 
the right direction” (Peter Li). 
 “If we strive towards a more rational ethics, free of bias, the importance of welfare 
biology will become clear and we will become more effective in reducing all kinds of 
suffering. Ng has made an important contribution to this effort” (Stijn Bruers). 
 “Ng should be commended for his progressive and yet cautious stance towards suffering 
in the wild, a topic that has only recently begun to attract much philosophical attention” 
(Kyle Johannsen). 
 
Let us continue working towards increasing welfare (human and animal), reducing 
suffering in particular, using appropriate measures, including safeguarding certain animal 
rights. However, the rights should be designed to increase net welfare overall, not rights for 
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